This paper examines issues surrounding protest, trespass and occupation -brought to the fore as a result both of recent social movements including the global Occupy movement and of emerging critical discourses about so-called 'new enclosures' -through a historical lens. Wary of histories of property and protest that rely heavily on the notion of the 'closing of the commons', the authors present a different story about the solidification of property rights, the securitisation of space and the gradual emergence of the legal framework through which protest is now disciplined. They do so via an exploration of three episodes in the making of property in land and three associated moments of resistance, each enacted via the physical occupation of common land. The first examines strategies for opposing enclosure in early sixteenth-century England; the second considers the Diggers' reimagining of property and the commons in the mid seventeenth century; and the third analyses the challenge to property rights offered by squatting and small-scale encroachments in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In so doing, the paper begins to rethink the relations between past and contemporary protest, considering how a more nuanced account of the history of common rights, enclosure and property relations might nevertheless leave space for new solidarities which have the potential to challenge the exercise of arbitrary power. If ultimately their aims were different, the technique of gathering together and occupying tied the protests together. The act of occupation is not a new one, though rarely has the physical and spatial act been given such symbolic prominence as in the Occupy movement. The practical and symbolic act -and thus public performance -of occupying public space was not just rooted in political symbolism but also a direct critique of the 'privatization' of public space. Occupy thus reclaims and remakes space for the public against the interests of those who seek to exclude and delimit the use of space supposedly once of the public. 1 Central to this assertion is the mobilization of the idea of the 'commons' to historically and conceptually underpin its actions. Indeed, central to Occupy's declared intent is the belief in the importance of, and a desire to return to, the 'commons', to throw off private property in land and, simply put, return the land to the people. In this oft-repeated narrative, before the demonic act of enclosure -on which more below -the land was of the people, unrestricted and unregulated for all to use. Enclosure closed the commons down, the hedges and fences erected forcing the poor from their land and gifting it to the wealthy rulers of rural England.
The act of enclosure signified the removal of (some or all) common rights and the excluding of those now without use rights (though note that certain rights of access were retained in some places, for instance to kill vermin). 7 Moreover, enclosure as an act of making private property, as a way of spatially excluding, is neither a temporally nor conceptually stable practice. The emergence of modern property rights, and specifically the idea that property in land was an enactment of spatial exclusion, emerged only in the sixteenth century. As the next section asserts, before then the concept of property was not invested in the thing itself but in rights to and in the thing. This is not to argue that there were not earlier acts of enclosing -clearly there were -but rather that each episode of enclosure and resistance to it always has its own particular geographies and histories. 8 While the politics of land and the commons has long been a canonical concern in rural history -essays by Alun Howkins in History Workshop Journal in 2002 and 2014 being notable recent landmarks -outside of work on international development, the interest of geographers has waxed and waned. 9 The recent resurgence of interest by geographers in ideas of the commons and enclosure is therefore of particular note. Responding to, as Jeffrey et al have put it, the fact that 'enclosure has emerged in recent years as a key process of neoliberal globalisation', geographers have both returned to the foundational intellectual and legal contexts of the 'enclosure movement' and revived and reframed the 'commons' and 'enclosure' as more-than-material metaphors in the present. 10 But there is a disjuncture between historical analyses and geographers' metaphorical appropriations.
It is here that this paper offers both a historical geographical corrective and a point of historiographical departure. It presents a different story about the history of land becoming property, something gradual and processual, a testing and teasing out of rights and access through which the modern concretized version of exclusive property in land emerges. This process provoked opposition: property did not suddenly become, nor was the becoming uncontested.
Notwithstanding the conceptual slippage and Occupy's challenge to the modern idea of property, the parallels with Occupy are striking in the shared attempt to assert use rights. Moreover, the tool of resistance was the same: occupying land to make the claim to use rights, engaging in acts of transgression and trespass. We also argue that attempts to concretize property rights and thus exclude others from land were in themselves the catalyst for the emergence of the technique of occupation as a spatial strategy for the excluded. This is not to say that the practice of occupation was invented in the sixteenth century, for earlier practices of literally staking claims to title represented occupations of a sort. Rather, it is to argue that the practice of occupation took on a different political meaning against the emergence of property as a spatially exclusive concept. And herein lies an irony: occupation as a protest practice borrows the logic of property, while at once trying to resist it. An individual or small group might occupy space as a means to resist the extension of private property rights, but whatever their claims for the commonweal their act of occupation was mimetic of individual, private possession.
What follows teases out these emergences and complexities through the lens of three moments in the making of property in land and three associated moments of resistance, each enacted via physical occupations of common land. The first examines strategies for opposing enclosure in early sixteenth-century England; the second considers the Diggers' reimagining of property and the commons in the mid seventeenth century; and the third analyses the challenge to property rights offered by squatting and small-scale encroachments in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. These episodes also serve to detail some of the foundational ways in which the securitisation of space, and the attendant legal framework used to discipline protest, emerged.
In so doing, the paper begins to rethink the relations between past and contemporary protest, considering how a more nuanced account of the history of common rights, enclosure and property relations might nevertheless leave space for new solidarities which have the potential to challenge the exercise of arbitrary power.
OCCUPYING ONE'S COMMON
The decades around the turn of the sixteenth century were a crucial moment in the history of property. It was then that the modern concept of property in land -as bounded, spatially exclusive and individually owned -first emerged. English medieval lawyers had not recognised property in land, but only goods and chattels. They had, moreover, seen property not as a shorthand for the goods themselves but as a right in or to the thing, an understanding fitting at a time when land typically had multiple use rights attached to it, each often invested in a different individual. Only in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did the concept of absolute property in land begin to emerge, a linguistic and legal development that was intimately bound up with land use changes, specifically enclosure. 11 As land was enclosed and common rights extinguished, previously distinct rights were increasingly bound together under a single legal owner and access to land increasingly determined by legal ownership.
The emergence of this new spatially exclusive concept of property in land was paralleled by changes in the use of other important concepts. The term 'trespass', for example, had originally referred to a general wrong against someone and was used in the mid thirteenth century to refer to a violation of the law not amounting to a felony, a category of crime which included theft, assault and even rape. 12 Yet by the mid fifteenth century this definition of trespass had hardened and the notion of trespass against property as a civil offence was beginning to emerge. By the mid seventeenth century the term was widely used to refer to an encroachment or intrusion on property it as 'an entry on another man's ground without legal authority, and doing some damage, however inconsiderable, to his real property'. 13 That damage might arise as a result of deliberate vandalism or the strategic occupation of the ground, but just bruising the grass by walking on it was enough to make a case for trespass. Thus we may point to a progressive spatialization of the term trespass, so that the generalized medieval concept was increasingly used in early modern England to discipline those that passed beyond a limit -a limit which may or may not have been visible on the ground, as Blackstone notes -or were otherwise 'out of place'. Much the same was true of the verb 'occupy' and its derivatives. Originally used to refer to the holding of an office, by the mid fifteenth century the term occupation was increasingly applied to the possession of real property.
14 Thus plaintiffs in the sixteenth-century courts asserted that they had 'peaceably occupied and enjoyed' land until evicted or menaced by the defendants who now unlawfully occupied their property. 15 Like trespass, occupation thus emerged as an increasingly spatialized concept over the course of the sixteenth century.
While the term 'occupy' was primarily used by litigants to refer to the possession of houses and land, it was also occasionally applied to the use of common land and resources. Thus, for example, the tenants of Disley in Cheshire argued that they had 'continually used and occupied a common pasture' until they were put out of possession by others who grazed their animals there.
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Litigants from Sutton, also in Cheshire, used much the same terminology, stating that they had 'from time immemorial occupied common of pasture' in the town moor until armed men from neighbouring Macclesfield had driven away their cattle and assaulted the Sutton men. 17 In constructing common land as occupied by the commoners, litigants both emphasized commoners' right to these resources and tried to provide a legal framework for their defence. The implication was that if commons and common rights could be occupied in much the same way as private property, then they might also be defended at law, whether that was in the common law courts, manorial courts or central equity courts. Here occupation functioned as the basis for a legal defence of common rights, a way of resisting encroachments on common land whether that threat came from neighbouring communities or enclosing landlords. As those involved in anti-enclosure riots were undoubtedly aware, occupation as an assertion of customary rights drew on two logics: firstly, on the emerging idea that possession was nine-tenths of the law; and secondly, on the notion that customary rights rested jointly on antiquity and on continual usage. 18 As a synonym for protest
'occupation' appears only in the second decade of the twentieth century, yet -as this paper
demonstrates -the practice of occupying land as a way of resisting private property had by then existed for several centuries. we might call 'self-help' strategies, modes of direct action by which groups and communities attempted to influence the allocation of local resources or defend important rights. 20 Crucially, as modes of direct action many of these strategies revolved around the physical occupation of land or resources, a taking back of what once had been common -in the limited sense outlined in the introduction -or a reestablishing of access to such common resources. It is these geographies of protest we turn to here.
Perhaps the best known of the range of practices by which enclosure could be resisted was hedge-breaking. In this most totemic of protest practices, groups of men, women and sometimes children banded together to pull down, dig up and burn the hedges and fences encircling enclosed land. Such incidents were recorded across much of sixteenth-century England from Somerset to Yorkshire and from Sussex to Lancashire. 21 As Nicholas Blomley points out, those who damaged hedges and fences both destroyed private property -the boundary itself, which belonged to the landowner -and attacked an important symbol of private property. 22 In doing so they dissolved the boundary between individualized, absolute property and non-property, between land held in severalty and that subject to common rights. Yet hedge-breaking was about much more than the destruction of a boundary feature. The point in breaking a hedge was to let cattle and sheep in to graze the ground in dispute, land which had once been grazed but from which the animals had been turned out by those who enclosed and hedged it. Thus accounts of hedge-breaking are almost always accompanied by complaints that rioters turned sheep, cows or horses into the closes in question, animals which usually belonged both to the rioters and their neighbours and are sometimes explicitly acknowledged to be those making up the common herd. 23 Here the commoners' animals physically occupied the space on behalf of their owners, reasserting customary grazing rights by consuming the grass growing there.
Animal occupations such as these did not only occur in cases where hedge-breaking was also reported. Sometimes gates and gate posts were removed in order to allow animals into enclosed land, or the gates simply held open while the town herd was driven into a hedged close where they quickly ate, trampled or otherwise destroyed the crop growing there. 24 To the owners of these enclosed parcels, this was trespass: the animals had passed beyond a limit (the hedge) and damaged private property (the grass), as in Blackstone's later formulation. Such animal trespasses were also a means of negotiating the boundaries between townships, especially where those boundaries ran through manorial wastes. 25 Custom and use were seen to delineate parochial geographies, and as in cases about enclosure and common rights, the physical occupation of land in dispute by one party's cattle or sheep was understood as a key determinant of ownership. Stray or out of place animals could be impounded under either common law or manorial by-laws, and the Star Chamber and other equity courts are full of cases referring to the impounding and subsequent rescuing of animals. 26 Such cases sometimes explicitly refer to the animals as having trespassed on the land in dispute and even occasionally refer to cattle and sheep as disorderly or riotous, echoing much of the language used to describe the people involved in anti-enclosure riots.
Occupations could, of course, be executed by people as well as animals. Plaintiffs bringing cases for hedge-breaking sometimes mention that the rioters occupied the fields for a week or more.
At Finedon in Northamptonshire, a large group of men were said to have spent more than a week pulling up hedges and digging up their roots, attended throughout by the ringing of the local church bells. 27 At Oundle in August 1611, rioters were said to have occupied land for twelve days, building 'cabbens and fortes' and using large dogs to keep the plaintiffs out. As at Finedon, the rioters were accompanied by the ringing of church bells, the playing of bagpipes, much shouting and general merriment. 28 There is no explicit mention here of either hedge-breaking or common rights, but the large group involved and the early August date suggests that customary rights to graze the stubbles after the harvest may lie at the heart of this case. Not that protest necessarily always took the form of protracted occupation of the land in dispute. Small groups or communities might demand or simply take resources which had once been common but to which access was now curtailed by hedges or other barriers. Thus, for example, a large group assembled on Pickering Moor in North Yorkshire to cut peat when their rights to this important fuel source, as well as to common grazing, were extinguished in the early sixteenth century. 30 At North Newbald in the East Riding of Yorkshire sixty people assembled on the village green in 1524 demanding underwood from recently enclosed land, while at Singleton Grange in Lancashire local men were said to have broken fences belonging to a local landowner in order to remove cartloads of marl from the land. 31 There were undoubtedly instances where communities quietly continued to remove wood or foodstuffs like nuts and berries from enclosed land, perhaps under cover of darkness, a situation which might or might not be tolerated by the landowner. Yet these community trespasses were something different: these were mass assemblies intended to attract attention and forcibly resist the privatization of land and other resources, though the invasion itself was only temporary.
Even fleeting occupations could leave their mark: the consumption of a grass crop, the breaking of hedges or the lopping of trees visibly signalled local opposition to the attempts to secure land or resources to the individual. In some parts of England, the conversion of arable land to pasture was resisted via mass invasions on the land, where rioters ploughed up the pasturedescribed in the subsequent court cases as having 'subverted the ground' -sometimes even manuring it and planting it with seedcorn. 32 As a mode of direct action, these mass ploughings were highly effective: the plough teams returned the land to its pre-enclosure use, resisting the depopulating impacts of conversion to pasture and making it difficult and costly for the landowner to return the land to pasture. The newly ploughed field, moreover, acted as a highly visible symbol of local opposition to land use change. In reasserting customary rights and the rule of communal agriculture via a physical remaking of the space, those involved quite literally subverted the property claims of enclosing landowners.
As we have argued, modern concepts of property rights did not emerge fully formed in the early sixteenth century. Instead there was a gradual solidification of property rights and law across the early modern centuries. As a result, these kinds of disputes, occupations and trespasses went on throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and beyond. 33 The next section of the paper turns to a rather different occupation of the commons, that of the Diggers' occupation of Surrey commons in 1649.
TAKING BACK THE COMMONS
By the late winter of 1649, Charles I had been executed and the world was -in a phrase drawn from a ballad of the time and later popularized by Christopher Hill -'turned upside down'. 34 In this heady climate, a small group of men and women occupied common land in a remote corner of Walton-on-Thames near Weybridge in Surrey. Here the Diggers -as they came to be knownplanned to found a new community where they would grow their own crops and practice a communal form of living which valued the land as a 'common Treasury for all'. 35 There had been five men involved in the first day of the digging on St George's Hill, but by the end of the first week twenty or thirty people had gathered together to burn the heath, dig the ground and plant it with carrots, peas and beans, and there were plans afoot to plough the land for barley. 36 The land was probably unstinted -that is, commoners were unrestricted as to the animals they could graze -and the grazing freely utilized by the tenants and householders of Walton and the surrounding parishes. 37 It was also Crown land and, they argued, the king being dead the land was 'returned againe to the Common people of England'. 38 This then was an agrarian squatter settlement, a mass occupation of under-utilized common land and though the group were small in number, their published writings invited others to join them and further expand the community. Gurney points out, the Diggers may have deliberately chosen a particularly barren stretch of land in Walton precisely because it offered them the opportunity to prove that they had divine blessing for their venture. 40 What it wasn't -and in sharp contrast to the anti-enclosure riots and occupations discussed above -was an attempt to reclaim customary rights lost as a result of the enclosure of a specific parcel of land.
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Instead, the Diggers offered a much more radical critique of existing concepts of property and property rights as they were practiced in mid seventeenth-century England than had the participants in anti-enclosure riots a century earlier. While there was some confusion in the reports about the colony published in the London newsbooks, Winstanley and the Diggers insisted that no private property would be affected: their focus was to reclaim common and uncultivated land and thus 'make the barren Ground fruitfull', rather than pull down park palings or otherwise attack private property. 42 Yet even to imply, as Winstanley repeatedly did, that the wastes were not privately owned was a wilful misunderstanding of the legal basis of common land which went against centuries of established legal and customary practice, as commentators at the time recognised. 43 As one put it, the Diggers were 'crack brained people' who 'thought because they were called commons, they belonged to any body, not considering that they are commons only for the inhabitants'. 44 In Winstanley's formulation, the commons were the birthright of the people which had been stolen away from them, an argument which he framed in historical, religious and moral terms, and which in turn drew on a popular tradition which Alun Howkins argues was still evident well into the nineteenth century. 45 The Diggers did not need to pull down hedges or park palings. Just to assert that common land belonged not to manorial lords but to the people was a creative remaking of the commons which undermined established understandings of property in dangerous ways. To occupy and dig the land, and so make Winstanley's radical vision concrete;
and then to encourage others to do the same, really was to turn upside down the established social order.
While the precise mechanics of change remain unclear in Winstanley's writing, the Surrey colony was undoubtedly envisaged as the first of many, the beginning of a wider movement to reclaim the commons of England for the benefit of the poor and needy. 46 In A Declaration from the Poor Oppressed People of England (published in late May 1649), Winstanley outlined plans to cut down and sell the wood growing on common land -which like the land itself, he saw as the people's inheritance -and use the profits to support the population of a larger network of communes until each community became self-sufficient. 47 Squatter settlements were established at Wellingborough in Northamptonshire and Iver in Buckinghamshire in spring 1650 -both of which published manifestos that showed the influence of Winstanley and melded religious radicalism with more local concerns over land and resources -as well as in Kent, Gloucestershire, Nottinghamshire and elsewhere. 48 With the exception of Wellingborough and Iver, we know very little about these other settlements but none lasted more than a few months before being crushed by the combined might of local landowners and the republican Council of State.
Yet the idea of occupying common land and founding a community was far from unique to the Diggers, as our third case study will argue. Other communities were successfully founded by squatters, sometimes with the support of the local landowner who saw the benefit of increased rents from former wasteland even if there was also opposition from other tenants and neighbouring manorial lords. 49 The analogies with squatter settlements were not entirely lost on contemporary commentators. Royalist pamphleteer Marchamont Nedham, for example, largely ignored the ideological underpinnings of the Diggers' project in order to dismiss them as 'poor people making bold with a little wast-ground in Surrey, to sow a few Turnips and sustain their Families'. 50 As
Gurney has demonstrated, as many as a third of the Diggers were local men and many of the most active individuals came from Cobham and the surrounding parishes. 51 The Walton colony was on some level a response to local issues including poverty and ongoing disputes over access to resources -conditions which may help to explain the fact that locals were willing to join the commune -even if it was the unique political circumstances of the 1640s and the religious and political convictions of Winstanley that made it happen. 52 Thanks to his published writings we know far more about Winstanley's vision than we do about either the other Diggers' colonies or unrelated squatter settlements, yet it was this very public and dangerously radical politics which meant the Diggers' colony was never going to be tolerated.
The Diggers suffered repeated assaults throughout their time at Walton, being violently driven from the hill on several occasions, their houses pulled down and their crops trampled. In early June 1649, two local freeholders led a procession of men dressed in women's clothing to the hill where they attacked the Diggers with staves and clubs. 53 While the authorities feared the radicalism of Winstanley's ideas, local antagonism may have sprung from a feeling that the Diggers' colony encroached on the Walton tenants' and freeholders' common rights in the waste. 54 In A Watch-word to the City of London (published August 1649) Winstanley complained that the common herd had been turned into a close near his home destroying the corn growing there. 55 This sounds like much the same kind of quid pro quo animal trespass seen a century earlier in disputes over common rights and enclosure, and is probably best interpreted as form of direct action against
Winstanley. Suits for trespass were brought against the Diggers in June 1649, and when damages were awarded against them one of the Diggers was briefly imprisoned and several cows distrained from Winstanley's home. In circumstances directly paralleling several of the Star Chamber cases discussed above, the cattle were quickly rescued by Winstanley's supporters though he later claimed the animals had been badly beaten while in the bailiff's care. 56 This was a well-rehearsed discourse: litigants who complained about their cattle being wrongfully distrained typically alleged that the animals had been ill treated by the other party. 57 Such was the scale of the opposition to the Walton colony that the Diggers had moved to a new site in nearby Cobham by late August 1649. Here they had a different reception. Opposition to them was led by a handful of local gentry rather than freeholders, the latter perhaps being more tolerant of the colony in part because many of its occupants were Cobham men. 58 Yet even here the Diggers did not go unmolested and the second colony survived only eight months until April 1650 when a combination of legal action and violent evictions brought it to an end. Several of the Diggers were indicted at the Southwark assizes for riot, illegal assembly, trespass, digging up the commons and illegally erecting cottages -the latter a standard charge brought against those who illegally enclosed the commons as private property -and, three weeks later, the remaining houses were burnt down and the Diggers evicted. 59 Men were hired to stop the Diggers returning and the commoners' cattle were turned onto the corn sown by the Diggers. 60 Thus the colony -itself an occupation -was brought to an end by a reoccupation of the commons and a reassertion of common use rights, even if it was private property interests which ultimately lay behind the Diggers' eviction. Here there is something of an irony. Measures more usually utilized to defend common rights in the face of enclosure and the extension of private property -including animal trespasses and legal actions against those who illegally erected cottages on common land -were used to evict the Diggers, a collective who claimed the commons not as private property but as communal treasury for all. From this complex constellation of ideas about what the commons were and whom they were for, we see the re-assertion of the status quo. The commons were for legally defined commoners -those with long established customary rights, usually attached to a particular dwelling in the village -not for the poor or the people more generally. Thus the Diggers' experiment failed, even if their principles and practices have continued to resonate with some groups and individuals throughout the subsequent centuries.
SQUATTING AND ENCLOSURE FROM THE BOTTOM UP
The afterlife of the Diggers awaits its historian. Indeed, it is far from certain that all of the 'occupations' that occurred in the immediate aftermath of the St. George's Hill commune were directly inspired by either Winstanley's political vision or the Diggers' actions. Rather, as Howkins has noted, notwithstanding that all such occupations followed a common pattern of the landless moving on to the common, erecting 'rough' cottages and planting the land, many sites 'may have grown out of more local conditions'. 61 As the previous section notes, the Diggers' protests represented a continuity of demotic action, albeit opportunistically seizing the initiative in the chaos of the 1640s, that itself was rooted in a deeply held set of popular beliefs that the land had [S]uch sturdy, and determined opposition from the foresters of the hamlet, who amounted to more than 200 men, that he was obliged to desist … no measures which he could have taken would have been effectual in repressing so inveterate an evil. 66 As Gilpin's comments make clear, squatting and assarting in the forest went neither unnoticed nor unopposed by the authorities. The battle -for that it often literally was -between the forest officers (or rather their lackeys) and the squatters was fought on an epic scale across constantly shifting sites. By the late eighteenth century, both the generic ancient forest law as well as dedicated New Forest parliamentary acts were dead letters in preventing and clearing encroachments in the face of vested interests, corruption and inadequate tools of measurement and surveillance. 67 The failed New Forest Bill of 1792 proposed the strengthening of these powers by forcing the keepers to report all encroachments within twelve months of their being made, it
hitherto not having been a statutory requirement of their office. 68 By late 1807, forest officers were even considering bringing actions of trespass -it being an area of English tort law, and thus a civil rather than criminal offence -against encroachers, though again inadequate mapping of encroached land proved a major problem in proceeding. 69 As the existence of settlements like East Boldre, Minstead and Nomansland today attests, the squatters won the battle. 70 Ultimately, squatters' settlements had to be considered differently, as potential assets rather than as unlawful incursions. Emergent settlements like East Boldre provided a valuable flexible workforce for farms on and at the edge of the forest as well as in emergent forest industries, including the dockyard at Buckler's Hard in Beaulieu parish. Beyond labour market issues and the howls of protest from those with recognized common rights, small incursions upon commons and wastes were of little material consequence to manorial lords. As
Gilpin saw it, such encroachments represented a mere 'petty trespass on a waste'. 71 Instead, a common strategy was to make official the encroachment by entering the property on the manorial roll and charging quit rents, thus turning an unlawful incursion into a source of income. 72 This 'continuous process of legitimisation over time' also means, as Colin Ward has suggested, that it is impossible to delineate the number of squats or their geographical distribution. 73 We also know that beyond profiting from encroachment the practice, in some contexts, was actively encouraged by landowners. This had, moreover, long been the case. From at least as early as 1189 -but gaining pace in the reigns of Henry III and Edward I -the Crown profited from the effective selling of forest land through assarts, a policy also used to encourage settlement in periods of low, or negative, population growth from the reign of Henry VIII onwards.
in the New Forest, and is systematically documented during the reign of Henry III. 75 While later material does not mirror this systematic approach to recording, the archive occasionally does detail approval for clearing forest land. Thus, for instance, Sir John Barbe was granted 'leave to cleanse some ground from shrubbs and bushes near his tenement' in 1694: in other words, to encroach and assart the forest. 76 Moreover, in both Ashdown and in the New Forest many encroachments were made not just by the poor seeking a practical solution to their poverty, but by those who held land at the edge of commons and wastes, and even by major landowners seeking to increase the value of their rentals. In 1807, by way of example, it was represented that while once the encroachments on the New Forest were made by the 'poorest people … Now the larger encroachments are made are made by men of substance who are prevailing themselves of 6-8 acres' at a time. 77 This is a reminder both of the scale of the problem faced by the authorities in the New Forest and the diverse socio-economic backgrounds of those who assarted land. Indeed we must be careful not to claim that squatters were heroic proto class warriors. They were not. While both were component parts in the economy of makeshifts of the poor, squatting and common rights acted in contradiction. 78 As Brian Short's analysis of 'lifespaces' in the nineteenth-century Ashdown Forest in Sussex attests, those who held legitimate, registered common rights muscularly sought to defend their rights -and hence their livelihoods -against the actions of squatters, just as the commoners and freeholders of Walton and Cobham had also done. 79 Yet the Crown lands, like the commons and wastes which survived the ongoing parliamentary enclosure movement, continued, in Sara Birtles's phrase, to be 'magnets for the poor and dispossessed'. This was in part a function of their spatiality: wastes and common pastures tending to 'exist at the fringes of settlements where limited squatting was less obtrusive'. It was also a function of the 'diverse natural products' found upon them that allowed squatters to eke out a 'basic subsistence'. 80 Depending on regulatory and surveillance systems, there was, therefore, a chance for the poor to settle, to occupy common land. Wherever remnant commons and wastes survived the parliamentary enclosures of the eighteenth century, opportunities to occupy the land were a vital way in which hitherto landless families got by. 81 In totality, such occupations represented a conscious attempt to take the land back for and by the people.
They also occurred on a scale far in excess of any sustained occupation in the modern period, and ultimately were far more successful than more coordinated attempts at settlement.
Indeed, as noted, only occasionally does the archive detail more systematic plebeian attempts to create settlements en masse on the commons. Moreover -as was undoubtedly the case for the This being Crown land, the right attaching to the Duke of Cornwall but 'leant by his officers by
Copy of Court Roll to divers tenants of that manor', the case was swiftly reported to the Home Office. On another manor 'a few miles off' a similar settlement had been recently effected and though it was feared that 'serious disturbances' would occur 'when the Parties are sought to be quitted from their wrongful occupancies' they were removed. 83 Of course, parliamentary enclosure massively reduced the scope for occupations from the bottom up at the same time as placing added pressure on those areas of common and waste that remained. Indeed, it is arguably no coincidence that a spike in the number of encroachments committed in the New Forest in the 1740s and 1750s occurred at the same time as an early wave of enclosure in the neighbouring counties. wastes. In part this was pragmatic and opportunistic, commons and moorland wastes offering space for large gatherings that were often beyond the direct surveillance of urban authorities. Thus a Manchester Chartist meeting in September 1838 on Kersal Moor reportedly attracted some three hundred thousand working people. 86 But it was also a political statement, gathering and occupying that land which was of the people. Or, in the words of a Kent Swing activist describing a gathering on the common at Rhodes Minnis in 1830, 'it was the Common that of every body'. 87 The act of working people gathering together on commonable land was therefore a deliberate act of occupying that which was theirs, something not yet taken away and enclosed by the systems of private property in land and the associated regimes of agrarian and industrial capitalism. As the social historian Roger Wells has stated, this discourse of making claims to, symbolically using and defending access to land for food, fuel and recreation was a constant theme of rural protest in the first half of the nineteenth century. 88 
CONCLUSIONS
Staking claims to land is necessarily an ancient practice for, by definition, in one person asserting title it acts to exclude others. Even before the wholesale shift of title under the Norman Conquest, we know that in Anglo-Saxon England grants of land were accompanied by pronouncing anathema to those acting against the gift, asserting both the importance of protecting title and the threat of opposition. 89 If we do not know how, or indeed explicitly if, such oppositions were manifested, we do know that common rights were recognised by the early Normans. They were documented in the Domesday Book of 1086 as being practiced by free tenants (common appendant) as well as given formal protection in afforested areas in the form of forest law. 90 Thus staking claims to land through practice, making claims through occupation, was deeply rooted: culturally, economically and legally. The moments of claim-making detailed in this paper are, therefore, just that, moments in a far longer historical geography of the concretization of the modern, spatially exclusive concept of property in land. But they represent pivotal moments in this becoming that both underline the continuity of certain claims and practices -not least that of occupation -as well as demonstrating that this was not a neat, linear process, but rather subject to complex contestations and contradictions.
What the examples detailed in this paper attest is that against attempts to make land exclusive -or, to put it another way, to make it more private by restricting and/or eliminating use rights held in common -the practice of occupation did not so much emerge as assume a different meaning. If the exercise of common rights -often stinted, regulated, controlled and resented -had once represented an act of resistance against controlling impulses, the acts of occupation detailed in this paper represent a reworking, a reinstatement of that which was now lost or threatened, a remaking as 'common' through a dissolution of the boundaries between absolute private property and non-property. 91 In several forms, from mass trespasses on recently enclosed land to the setting up of new communities on the commons, from squatting through to buying land for the working poor, to occupy was to take back, to (re)assert that which was theirs but had been taken away, whether that 'theft' was recent and material or ancient but deeply felt. If all such practices, whatever their practical differences, were united by offering a critique of the idea of exclusive property in land they were also united in being drawn in the languages of custom and use, specifically the idea that one could make claims to land via use rights rather than an assertion of exclusive ownership. Yet they were also all mimetic of the spatial logic of private property, borrowing the idea of physically occupying land in order to destabilize claims to exclusive and individualized private ownership. This was not a rejection of law or capitalism, but rather an adjustment, a creative remaking of the commons which, for brief moments at least, had the potential to challenge the emerging logic of absolute property in land. Conceived in this way, historical geographies of land-based occupation can be understood, after David Harvey, as a response to a long history of accumulation by dispossession, demotic reactions to earlier waves of privatization and commodification in land. 92 Conversely, as the foregoing analyses attest, occupation could also be a way of making property, encroachments on commons and wastes a literal grabbing of land by the poor and rich alike.
Acts such as trespass, hedge-breaking and wood-taking might seem, at such temporal distance, to be partial, circumscribed acts of resisting absolutes, but through repetition and collective action they represented a genuine testing and negotiating of the limit of property. It was through such acts that cracks in property's grid, to paraphrase Nicholas Blomley, emerged. 93 An understanding of trespass is telling here. The act of trespass against land, that most obvious act of refusing to sanction new bounded property forms, was, as noted, a civil offence, and thus subject to complex and expensive civil action. Against this, magistrates often either used their discretion in such cases, or fined the defendant on another point of criminal law which, when dealt with summarily, required little explicit proof, such as the taking of wood. 94 The 'solution' for landowners came in the form of the 1820 Malicious Trespass Act. 95 The Act, revised in 1827, allowed for the summary conviction of property 'offenders' simply by asserting that defendants were out of place. This was not only a radical reworking of the idea of trespass, it now being both a civil and a criminal offence, but also represented a controversial transformation of the prosecution of offences against property. 96 If the Diggers had fundamentally challenged the very idea of absolute property in the mid seventeenth century, by the early decades of the nineteenth century the concept and practice of private property in land had increasingly solidified, given legal and material form via the ongoing enclosure movement and by such judicial responses to ongoing acts of resistance as these. 97 To put it bluntly, the landowners had by then won the battle for England's countryside.
Yet in many ways this is to paint too simplistic a picture, for resistances were not always a clear-cut case of the dispossessed (or disadvantaged) acting against capitalist accumulators. In relation to squatting we see that other individuals -rich and poor alike -occasionally acted in defence of their common rights. Similarly, it would be wrong to suggest that all poor rural dwellers supported and stood to benefit from oppositions to Diggers-style occupations. Besides, as the foregoing analysis has shown, many of the moments of opposition were rooted not only in mimesis but also often in an explicitly ironic and distinctly Bakhtinian carnivalesque, the turning upside down of the order of the world for a moment. 98 The moments of opposition considered here, and the story of the way in which the strategy of occupation as we understand it today emerged in antagonism to forms of accumulation by Pratirodh Committee in India. 99 These interrelated movements and moments may transcend the scale of most of the networks of opposition detailed here, but the contexts are strikingly familiar, and therefore the practices, claims and successes of the past can meaningfully form a toolbox of opposition for today. We know that past protests, not least in the critical context of rural England -that hotbed of the making of the tools of colonial governance and the context of so much inspiring work that has subsequently conceptually underpinned work in development studies and social movement studies -are frequently drawn upon to inspire and legitimise the present, the example of the Diggers 2012 occupation/eco-camp at Runnymede writing this influence large. 100 If the commons as they were practiced in medieval and early modern England were not always the challenge to property we sometimes imagine them to be, we still hope that in offering this carefully nuanced history of enclosure and common rights, and in detailing the complex and contingent interplay between property and protest, we can open up spaces for new solidarities in the contemporary world. That the commons never did belong to the people, does not mean they should not.
